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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
VICTOR RIOS,

Case No. 20090862

Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Burglary, a 1st
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2009); Aggravated Assault, a
3rd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2009), in the Second
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan, Judge,
presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for aggravated
burglary where Rios was alleged to have entered or remained unlawfully in the motel
room.
8

Issue II: Whether this Court should define the "remains unlawfully" provision of Utah's
burglary statute to require surreptitiousness.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict, this Court
reviews "the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Hubba,
2002 UT App 175,5 2,51 P.3d 21 (citation omitted). This Court "will reverse the
conviction only when the evidence . . . i s sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained fr reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. Quada, 918 P.2d
883, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).
These issues were not preserved by counsel, who failed to make an objection or
file appropriate motions. It is Mr. Rios's contention thatfyiscounsel was ineffective for
failing to do so and that this Court may still review the matters under a plain error
standard. See State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,5 12, 55 P.3d 1131.
Counsel also did not preserve the issue on the statutory construction of the
burglary statute. This court reviews issues of statutory construction for correctness,
according no deference to the legal conclusions of other (pourts. State v. Martinez, 2002
UT 80, J 5,52 P.3d 1276. Defendant contends that this cpurt may still construe the
statute, as a matter of law, despite counsel's failure to preserve this issue under a plain
error analysis. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 12, 10 P.3d 346.
9

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2009); Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-203 (2009); Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (2009); Utah R. Crim. P. 12,23 and 24.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated March 17,2009, the State charged Victor Rios
("Appellant," "Victor," "Rios") with Aggravated Burglary, a 1stdegree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2009); and Aggravated Assault, a 3rd degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2009).
On August 26-27,2009, both counts were tried before a jury, in the Second
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan, Judge,
presiding. The jury convicted Mr. Rios of both counts. Mr. Rios filed a timely notice of
appeal on October 15,2009.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 16,2009, at 1:13 a.m. in Ogden City, Officer Steve Zaccardi was
dispatched to a domestic disturbance at the Courtyard Hotel. (R. 130:13-15, 19,45.) The
caller described hearing a struggle and a woman calling out for help. (R. 130:16.) About a
minute or two later, as the officer approached the scene, he observed a male running
toward a bar. (R. 130:45; 17; 18.) The male looked unsure of himself, stopping, looking

10

underneath a car and looking down an alley. (R. 130:18.) Nonetheless, the officer
continued on to the call, never getting this person's information. (R. 130:18; 49.)
When he arrived at the Courtyard Hotel—what the officer described as a cheap
hotel in a high crime neighborhood—this individual apprpached the officer, asking him if
had heard the pop. (R. 130:19; 51.) The officer replied thit he had not and the man
mentioned that "there was a woman down here screaming for help", gesturing toward the
bar. (R. 130:21.) Officer Zaccardi called for backup, at which point the man ran off. (R.
130:21.)
The officer went to room 253, his dispatch location, where he found Joy VanDyke,
on her bed yelling, apparently at 911. (R. 130:21; 22,10,|14-15.) Ms. VanDyke indicated
she had been attacked by a male. (R. 130:22.) The office^ testified she was "very upset"
and "very distraught", though she appeared to be "very certain of her statements ..." (R.
130:42.)
Ms. VanDyke testified that she had been staying at the Courtyard Hotel for around
ten days. (R. 130:58.) On March 16,2009 at around 1 an}, she heard repeated knocks on
the door, but didn't answer because of the lateness of the hour. (R. 130:59.) The person
kept knocking and so she opened the door, not bothering to look through the peephole,
even though she did not know anyone who would come by her room that late. (R. 130:75,
76.) A man asked her if she had a joint. (R. 130:22; 59.) She testified that she laughed
and stated, "No, I don't have any joints. Only cigarettes.'^ (R. 130:60.) She testified that
11

the individual who knocked on the door was Mr. Rios. (R. 130:60.) Ms. VanDyke
testified that she offered the man a cigarette, at which point her dog "was trying to attack
him." (R. 130:60; 61.) She turned to grab a pack of cigarettes off a chest of drawers,
dragging her dog, and when she turned back, the defendant had entered the motel room.
(R. 130:61; 77.)
Ms. VanDyke then approached the man to give him the cigarettes and told him to
leave the room. (R. 130:61.) She testified that the man "proceeded to move toward" her.
(R. 130:63.) Her specific testimony was that "he came into my room as my back was
turned ... behind me; and I turned around and he had $2 that he was giving me. I says,
'No, I don't want it. Just go.'" (R. 130:79; 63; 69.) She stated, "Here's the cigarettes" and
he "got in his pocket and he gave me $2.1 said, i don't want the money. Just keep the
money. Just get out.'" (R. 130:63.) He "meandered toward the door," she testified. (R.
130:63.) "I kept saying, 'Go. Get out. Get out. Go," she testified. (R. 130:63.) Ms.
VanDyke testified that she never asked him to enter her room, nor did she give him
permission to stay. (R. 130:73.)
When the man was standing in the door casing, he turned around "like he was
having second thoughts" (R. 130:79) and Ms. VanDyke "shoved him to try and get him
out so I could slam the door." (R. 130:63.) At this point, she testified that the man hit her
in the forehead. (R. 130:63.) Prior to this point, Ms. VanDyke testified that there had
been no violence. (R. 130:79.)

12
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gave to Mr. Rios. (R. 130:40-41) (Officer Zaccardi indicated that Ms. VanDyke stated
"this is the pack of cigarettes that I . . . gave him. He asked for cigarettes and I gave him
the whole pack.") The officer admitted that although the surface of the cigarette pack
could have been dusted for prints, that work was not done. (R. 130:54-55.)
The officer noticed two multi-colored cream buttons on the floor of the motel
room. (R. 130:24; 25.) One of the buttons still had thread on it. (R. 130:25.) The officer
had to lift a bed in order to see one of the buttons underneath it. (R. 130:26-27; 29.)
According to Officer Zaccardi, Ms. VanDyke had a bruise on her forehead, red
marks on her neck, scratches on her arms, a cut on her hand and scrapes on her elbows,
though photographs were only shown of marks on her elbows, leg, knee, fingers and
neck. (R. 130:30; 32; 33.) The officer's opinion was that the marks were consistent with
someone grabbing the neck (R. 130:30) and Ms. VanDyke testified these marks were
from the injuries she sustained that night and not from prior injuries. (R. 130:72.)
At this point, Officer Michah Stephens arrived at the Courtyard Inn. (R. 130:90.)
Walking up the north stairwell, he encountered the defendant who was wearing a plaid
shirt and blue jeans. (R. 130:90.) The officer asked Mr. Rios what he was doing and he
responded that "he was there drinking with a friend." (R. 130:92.) Mr. Rios did not tell
the officer which room he had been at. Id. The defendant stated that he was sorry and that
it was his fault. Id. When asked specifically what he meant by that, Mr. Rios stated that
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At trial, an individual named Ric^ Gurule testified. He worked as a security guard
at the El Mirador Bar. (R 130:8" x Me testified that at around 1:30 am. a. i ..u to escort
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testified that Mr. Rios's shirt appeared to be in good condition that evening, with the shirt

buttoned up to the top. (R. 130:86.) Mr. Gurule did not see any injuries on Mr. Rios. (R.
130:86.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Rios contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to convict him of
the burglary count because it presented no evidence at the trial, which would support a
conclusion that Mr. Rios formed the intent to commit the burglary either before entering
Ms. VanDyke's apartment or after he remained unlawfully on the apartment. The
evidence could rationally support a contention that Mr. Rios unlawfully remained on Ms.
VanDyke's property, but not that he ever formed an intent to commit any sort of criminal
offense prior to this unlawful remainder. At best, the evidence supports a conclusion that
Mr. Rios formed his intent to assault Ms. VanDyke the moment she pushed him, trying to
get him to leave her apartment. This error should have been obvious to the trial court,
which had a duty to dismiss this count. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 17, 10 P.3d
346.
Second, Mr. Rios contends that the burglary statute requires an element of
surreptitiousness if the defendant is charged with remaining unlawfully on the premises.
Burglary at common, and in modern, law requires that defendants engage in some sort of
surreptitious behavior in order to "unlawfully remain" on the premises. Otherwise,
persons could be convicted of burglary who commit crimes after they have been asked to
leave. For example, a repairman who subsequently strikes a homeowner could be charged
16
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ARGUMENT
L MR, RIOS'S BURGLARY CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
THE STATE FAILED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT MR,
RIPS ENTERED OR REMAINED IN A DWELLING WITH AN INTENT TO
COMMIT A FELONY, THEFT OR ASSAULT,

Mr. Rios contends that the State did not present evidence showing that he entered
or remained on the victim's property with the intent to commit a crime, and as such failed
to meet the elements of burglary. He also contends that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve this issue and that this Court should find that the trial court committed
plain error by failing to dismiss the burglary charge.
A. Mr. Rios's Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Move to Dismiss the
Aggravated Burglary Count, but this Court may Review this Issue for
Plain Error,
Mr. Rios contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him of
the burglary count. Because Mr. Rios's counsel did not raise this issue at the trial court,
Mr. Rios has the burden of demonstrating "the trial court committed plain error by
submitting the case to the jury." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,5 12,55 P.3d 1131.
This Court must examine the record to determine whether "after viewing the evidence
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes for
18

'iinliinii ,ind intmuil quotation omitted).
~ « v liicii

ve undertake an s:\iiiMihdum of the ••- H*M v determine 'whether the

evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental iluit it was plain error to submit Ihe
;

case

).

In other words, the defendant has a. burden to "demonstrate first that the e\ idence
was insufficicnl In suppnil a MIIIMI linn ml tin i iiiiiiiiiii i !iai|jnl

Sttih i Uoli;!!!!* • <MMI 11 I

7 : 1 f 1 1 1< I1 " kl 146 Sec :<: )iid, the uciciidant must show "that the insufficiency was so
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury " Id.
The Marshaled Evidence Does Not Support a Finding that Mr, Rios
Entered or Remained in a Dwelling with thcf Intent to Commit a Felony,
Theft, or Assault,
"When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of a jury's verdict, he must marshal
the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidei ice is

2009 UT App 369,5 33,645 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal citation and quotation omitted)
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"cause[d] bodily injury to another in the course of the burglary." State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, J[ 25,10 P.3d 346 referring to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203.
Defendant's contention is that the state presented sufficient evidence to show that
Mr. Rios remained unlawfully in the building and that there was sufficient evidence to
show that he caused bodily injury to Ms. VanDyke. Ms. VanDyke testified that after she
picked up the cigarettes, Mr. Rios handed her $2 and "meandered" toward the door. (R.
130:63.) She repeatedly asked him to leave. Id. At the door casing, he turned around, and
Ms. VanDyke shoved him "to try and get him out." Id. This act alone is probably
sufficient basis for a jury to find that Mr. Rios "remained" unlawfully. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1). Additionally, Ms. VanDyke's testimony was replete with
allegations of assault—including him choking her until she nearly blacked out. (R.
130:63-67.) The state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find the "aggravated"
element of burglary in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203.
Yet, no evidence was presented from which a jury could infer that Mr. Rios had
the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault when he entered or remained on the
premises. At the trial, the State presented the following evidence regarding Mr. Rios's
intent to commit a burglary. This evidence will be presented in a light most favorable to
the State.
1. Mr. Rios continued to knock on Ms. VanDyke's door at around 1 am. (R.
130:59-60.)
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around her throat. (R. 130:65.)
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13. As Ms. VanDyke began to black out, Mr. Rios got up off of her, walked out
the door and left. (R. 130:66-67.)
14. When Mr. Rios was apprehended, he stated to officers that he was sorry
and that it was his fault. (R. 130:92.)
15.The officers asked Mr. Rios what he meant by that and he replied that he
had been drinking. (R. 130:92-93.)
The first fundamental problem in the verdict surrounded the intent element.
[I]ntent may be proven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, and intent is rarely established by direct evidence. We therefore
must look to the circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom to determine whether '"the evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust.
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5J 26, 10 P.3d 346 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
The state does not have direct evidence of Mr. Rios's intent, so the key question is
whether the circumstantial evidence justifies a conclusion that Mr. Rios entered the hotel
with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault.
Assault/Sexual Assault. The state could argue that Mr. Rios remained in Ms.
VanDyke's apartment in order to commit some sort of assault, but this is extremely
difficult to extrapolate from the evidence. First, at no point did Ms. VanDyke tell him that
he could not come into her apartment. She indicated that she would get him some
cigarettes and she turned her back to get them. (R. 130:61; 77.) He entered her property at
this point and produced two dollars, which is highly consistent with an intent to pay her
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for the cigarettes. At this point, Ms. VanDyke asked him to leave and he "meandered"
toward the door. (R. 130:63.) When Mr. Rios turned arouhd in the door casing, a
reasonable inference the jury could have made was that he remained in the premises
without Ms. VanDyke's permission.
Yet this is a crucial moment: nothing about Mr. Rips's behavior indicated that
when he remained in the door casing, that he had the intent to commit some sort of
assault. He had not been violent or threatening previously. No statements were made to
this effect. He never touched Ms. VanDyke. He was not Aggressive. Only when Ms.
VanDyke shoved him did Mr. Rios engage in the assault,
A reasonable jury could certainly conclude that M t Rios manifested the intent to
commit an assault, but the key is that the intent only manifested itself after Ms. VanDyke
admitted to shoving Mr. Rios. There simply are no piece$ of evidence or no reasonable
inferences from that evidence which would justify that Mr. Rios had the intent to commit
the assault before he unlawfully remained on the premises. He asked her about a joint and
they talked about cigarettes. He remained in her door casing when she asked him to
leave. Nothing else was discussed and no other evidence was presented—no reasonable
inferences can be made from those facts which would indicate that Mr. Rios had the
intent to commit an assault. Again, the key is that prior to Ms. VanDyke's shove, no
evidence was presented to indicate an intent to commit an assault.

23

On the contrary, the evidence supports the inference that Mr. Rios manifested the
intent to commit the assault as soon as he was shoved by Ms. VanDyke. As soon as she
shoved him, Mr. Rios became extremely violent. Yet this behavior was precipitated by
the shove and probably by Mr. Rios's level of intoxication.
Theft. There is no question that Mr. Rios lacked the intent to commit a theft
because Ms. VanDyke indicated that Mr. Rios paid her two dollars for the cigarettes. (R.
130:61; 63; 69; 79.) Nothing was stolen from the room before, during or after the crime.
No implication was ever made that the defendant possessed this intent. Finally, and
perhaps significantly, Mr. Rios stood up abruptly and left—he didn't take anything,
which he certainly could have if he intended to commit a theft. Even if we assume that
Mr. Rios entered Ms. VanDyke's apartment (or remained unlawfully), the law still
requires additional proof. "The mere unlawful entry into private premises may not alone
support a finding of intent [to commit theft|." State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah
1986). The state must present more evidence than a mere unlawful entry or remainder.
Felony. Looking at the state's marshaled evidence, it is difficult to find a felony
that Mr. Rios intended to commit. Mr. Rios did ask Ms. VanDyke if she had a joint,
which is certainly criminal behavior. But the problem with a burglary charge is that the
state would have to show that Mr. Rios entered or remained on Ms. VanDyke's property
in order to commit that crime. There is no evidence of that. When Ms. VanDyke denied
having the marijuana, the subject changed quickly to cigarettes, which Ms. VanDyke
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went to get, for which Mr. Rios paid her. The key is whether Mr. Rios entered or
remained on the property for the intent to get drugs. He never pursued that subject with
her further and no evidence was presented showing that Mr. Rios intended to complete a
drug deal. When Mr. Rios abruptly got up and left, he did not search through her house in
an attempt to find drugs.
The State clearly showed that Mr. Rios remained unlawfully in Ms. VanDyke's
room, but there was no evidence presented from which a reasonable jury could infer that
he had the intent to commit one of the required offenses when he remained on the
property. In fact, evidence to support this element was "completely lacking." State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 26,10 P.3d 346.
Appellate courts have found insufficient evidence in burglary cases for even
stronger cases than this one. In Walls v. State, 299 S.W.2(i 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957),
the court found insufficient evidence for a burglary wher0 the defendant walked into a
grocery store with pants open and his privates exposed, saw the complainant and her
friend, said, "Oh" and then left the store. Id. at 953 (reasoning that insufficient evidence
was presented that the defendant intended to commit a sexual assault).
The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for burglary where the evidence
showed that the defendant stabbed another person in his l|iome. Warrick v. United States,
528 A.2d 438 (D.C. App. 1987). In that case, the defendant entered a home while most of
the family was asleep. Id. at 440. The victim arrived home and the defendant came to his
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back, said "Stick up" and stabbed him in the neck. Id. The victim and defendant struggled
as several family members also woke up and participated in the fight. Id. During the
struggle, the defendant repeatedly said, "Sharon let me in" and fled. Id. After the
struggle, the family noticed their T.V. sitting in a carrying bag on the living room floor,
having been moved from its location on a stand. Id. at 441.
The D.C. Court cited some authority for determining intent:
Unauthorized presence in another^ premises does not alone support an inference
of criminal purpose at the time of entry, but when the unauthorized presence is
aided by other circumstances, such an inference may be drawn. We have never
attempted to narrowly define the kind of "other circumstances" which might
support an inference of criminal intent, preferring to consider in each case whether
the circumstances are such as might lead reasonable people, based upon their
common experience, to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
intended to commit some crime upon the premises.
Id. at 442 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
The court found insufficient evidence for a burglary, noting the assault and the
potential theft.
The fact that Warrick committed an assault once inside the premises does not
justify an inference that he intended to do so when he entered the home. Cf. Parker
v. United States, 449 A.2d 1076, 1077 (D.C. 1982) (the sole fact that person who
entered premises on legitimate business stole property once inside "very likely"
would not support inference of intent to commit crime at time of entry). As to his
placement of a T.V. set in a bag, although this evidence may support an inference
of an intent to steal, it is not indicative of an intent to commit assault.
Id. (emphasis added). The court also considered the dangerous weapon.
We are left with the fact that at the time he entered the Malone home, Warrick was
armed with a dangerous weapon. This evidence might support an inference that he
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intended to use the weapon if somebody attempted to interfere with his taking of
property. A conviction for burglary may not rest on such an "//".
Were we to hold that intent to commit assault may be inferred from possession of
a dangerous weapon, such an inference could be made in every case in which a
defendant was charged with burglary while armed1 substantially relieving the
government of the burden of proving intent in sucfy cases.
Id. (emphasis added).
Like Warrick, the Mr. Rios contends that the state presented no evidence showing
that he possessed the intent to commit any sort of offensei either when he entered her
property or when he remained unlawfully on her property]. And like Warrick, this court
should find that the mere fact that a person committed an assault while on the premises
does not justify a finding that the intent was present prioi to the assault.
Other courts have agreed with this contention that mere commission of a crime on
the premises is insufficient to sustain a burglary conviction. "We feel that the fact that the
accused commits a crime within the structure entered is, without more, insufficient to
prove his intent to commit a crime at the time of entry." Commonwealth v. Crowson, 405
A.2d 1295,1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (citing State v. Johnson, 466 P.2d 29,30 (Ariz.
App. 1970); State v. Keys, 419 P.2d 943,947 (Or. 1966).
In one case, the defendant entered a property, and while the victim told him to
leave or she would call the police, he attempted to enter through the front door, back door
and window. Rodriguez v. Florida, 460 So.2d 514 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984). The court found
insufficient evidence on an attempted burglary because the state failed to show the
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defendant had the intent to commit an offense in her home. Id. at 514. That court felt the
facts better supported the elements of trespass. Id.
Mr. Rios would contend his case is similar to the Rodriguez case in that the
elements better fit a trespass conviction over those of a burglary, simply because of the
missing intent in his case. The state certainly presented evidence that Mr. Rios remained,
albeit slightly, beyond Ms. VanDyke's permission, which would amount to a trespass, but
not a burglary. See also B.D. v. Florida, 412 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding
insufficient evidence for a burglary conviction but sufficient evidence for a trespass
conviction).
In another case, the defendant was observed by store security in a K-Mart putting
a bag in his cart. Illinois v. O'Banion, 625 N.E.2d 451 (111. Ct. App. 1993). Security
watched him put three video games in the bag, one in his coat pocket and walk toward the
front of the store. Id. at 451-52. The defendant left the store with the items and without
paying for them. Id. at 452. The court found insufficient evidence for a burglary because
the state presented no evidence that the defendant intended to commit a theft when he
entered the store. Id. There had to be circumstances, the court said, which supported the
felonious intent upon entry. Id.
One court found insufficient evidence for a burglary where the defendant cut the
screen on the back door and fled when noticed by the home's occupants. Ramon v. Texas,
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657 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App. 1983) (declining to find suffipient evidence for burglary with
intent to commit rape or trespass).
The Florida District Court of Appeal found insuffipient evidence to convict on a
burglary where the defendant entered a home without permission and had a huge beer and
marijuana party. P.D.T. v. Florida, 996 So. 2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Finding
that the state presented evidence that the defendant was irl the home without permission
and that he entered to "party", the court found that the state presented no evidence that
the defendant, when he entered the home, had the intent tb drink beer or smoke
marijuana. Id. at 920. It cited another Florida case in whi^h a defendant entered a mobile
home and subsequently wrote with a marker on the wall. \[d. at 919-20, citing R.C. v.
State, 793 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In that case, the court said that a
reasonable inference could have been made that the defendant entered without
permission, but not that he intended to commit a crime when he entered. R.C. v. State,
793 So. 2d 1078 at 1079.
The Washington Court of Appeals also found insufficient evidence to convict of a
burglary where a defendant was found inside an auto shop. State v. Young, 2004 Wash.
App. LEXIS 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Officers responded to an alarm of a broken
window at the auto shop and the defendant was found passed out in a vehicle inside the
shop. Id. at 1-2. The shop's owner testified that the defendant did not have permission to
be in the shop and that all the windows were intact when he closed earlier that evening.
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Id. at 2. The defendant testified at that trial and admitted that he was in the car, but could
not remember how he got there. Id. at 2-3. The court found insufficient evidence for a
burglary because the state only presented evidence that he entered or remained, not that
he had the intent to commit a crime. Id. at 8-9.
This court has held that the intent must be established by factors other than the
entering or remaining unlawfully.
Entering or remaining unlawfully is insufficient, by itself, to support a charge of
burglary. See State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113,117 (Utah 1986). In addition to entering
or remaining unlawfully, the intent to commit a felony, theft,.. . assault, or
lewdness, or sexual battery therein must be proved, or circumstances shown from
which the intent may reasonably be inferred.
State v. Alexander, 2009 UT App 188, J 11, 214 P.3d 889 (quoting Peck v. Dunn, 51A
P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1978)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The above-cited cases stand for two general propositions. First, in order to prove
the intent to commit a burglary, the state must present evidence beyond the mere
commission of a crime on the premises. Second, the state must also present evidence of
an intent to commit a crime beyond the defendant entering or remaining unlawfully.
There must be circumstances which show the intent existed before the defendant entered
or before the defendant remained unlawfully. Although the state did present evidence
supporting the commission of a crime on the premises and that the defendant may have
remained unlawfully, those two factors, by themselves, are insufficient to show the intent
to commit a burglary.
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C. The Insufficiency Was So Obvious and Fundamental that the Trial Court
Erred in Submitting the Case to the Jury
According to Rule 12 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the
evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment,
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 (p) (2009). The court has the discretion to dismiss the charge, but has
an obligation to do so when the defendant makes a motioh. See Utah R. Crim. P. 23
(2009) ("At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, j:he court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted
do not constitute a public offense ..."). See also, Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) ("The court may,
upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the
rights of a party.").
Despite the non-mandatory nature of the language in the rules, Utah law still
requires the court to affirmatively dismiss a case for a failure to meet the elements of the
offense. "When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged." Utah Code Ann. § 7713-3 (2009) (emphasis added).

31

The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the Holgate opinion. "Under this
provision, the trial court 'shall' grant relief when the evidence is insufficient, even if a
defendant fails to properly raise the issue, but only when the evidentiary defect is
'apparent' to the trial court." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,5 15,10 P.3d 346. Construing
this provision, the court gave some guidance to when an error would be apparent:
While it is difficult for the court on appeal to dictate when an evidentiary defect
was apparent to the trial court, there is a certain point at which an evidentiary
insufficiency is so obvious and fundamental that it would be plain error for the
trial court not to discharge the defendant. An example is the case in which the
State presents no evidence to support an essential element of a criminal charge.
The plain error exception would serve to avoid a manifest injustice in such a case.
Id. at 5 17 (emphasis added).
Defendant contends that the arguments he has already made justify this
conclusion. The state presented no evidence at the trial from which a jury could infer that
Mr. Rios developed the intent to commit a burglary before he was struck by Ms.
VanDyke. The trial court should have been aware of this issue because it was
fundamental: it revolved around the lack of presentation of any evidence to a key element
of the offense—the defendant's intent after the unauthorized entry..
II. THE COMMON LAW AND UTAH LAW BOTH REQUIRE A
SURREPTITIOUS ELEMENT TO BE PART OF THE "REMAINING
UNLAWFULLY" COMPONENT OF BURGLARY

In Utah, a burglary may be committed if a person "remains unlawfully" on the
premises of another with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault therein. Utah Code
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Ann. § 76-6-202 (1) (2009). The "remains unlawfully" language should be narrowly
construed so that it only applies to situations in which the person surreptitiously
manifests an intent to commit the crime after lawful entry.
A, The Common Law Supports a Surreptitious Element to Burglary
At common law, burglary consisted of "the breaking and entering of a dwelling of
another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony." Deadly Force to Arrest;
Triggering Constitutional Review, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 361, 365, n. 34.
Sir William Blackstone argued that burglary "has always been looked upon as a
very heinous offence: not only because of the abundant terror that it naturally carries
with it, but also as it is & forcible invasion of that right of habitation, which every
individual might acquire even in a state of nature." Quoted in Theodore E. Lauer,
Wyoming Division: Article: Burglary in Wyoming, 32 L$nd & Water L. Rev. 721,723
(1997) (emphasis added). Andrew Horn in his, The Mirror of Justices (ca. 1320), defined
burglary as an offense "committed not only by breaking a house but on those who are in
their own houses with the intention of reposing therein ir\ peace. The aforesaid assault
must be made with intent to kill, rob or beat those within the house." Id. at 725, quoting
Andrew Horn, The Mirror of Justices 28 (Selden Society ed., vol. 7, 1893) (emphasis
added). In the 16th century, William Lambarde defined thp elements of burglary, most of
which still exist today: "If any person have by night broken any house, tower, walles, or
gates, and hath entred in with intent to do any robberie, rr^urder, or other felonious act
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there." Id. at 726. Sir Edmund Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England written in 1641,
had formulated the common law definition: UA BURGLAR (or the person that
committeth burglary) is by the common law a felon, that in the night breaketh and entreth
in to a mansion house of another, of intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit
some other felony within the same, whether his felonious intent be executed or not." Id.
Yet the common law also dealt with the situation in which a person gained entry
into a home and subsequently committed an offense. It required the person to "break
out." M a t 727-28.
In 1962, the Model Penal Code's drafters addressed the issue of burglary,
particularly since a variety of burglary statutes existed among the states. Id. at 732. They
subsequently defined burglary.
A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is
licensed or privileged to enter. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for
burglary that the building or structure was abandoned.
Id. quoting Model Penal Code § 221.1(1).
The commentators to the code sought to narrow it to situations in which someone
invades "the premises under circumstances especially likely to terrorize occupants."
Model Penal Code § 221.1, cmt. 2 at 67. For states that had adopted a concept of
burglary including the "remaining in" language, the commentators urged that it be limited
to suspects who surreptitiously remain after consensual entry.
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There is a difficulty with the ["remains unlawfully"] language, however, that
should lead to its rejection. As the Brown Commission pointed out, it literally
would include "a visitor to one's home . . . who becomes involved in an argument
with his host, threatens to punch him in the nose, and is asked to leave; if he does
not leave, but continues his threatening argument, he would . . . be guilty of
burglary." For this reason, the Final Report of the Brown Commission included in
the burglary offense one who entered or "surreptitiously" remained without license
or privilege.
Id. cmt. 3(a) at 67-71, as quoted in Delgado v. Florida, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000).
Other commentators agree with this limiting language.
This common statutory expansion in the definition of burglary makes great sense.
A lawful entry does not foreclose the kind of intrusion burglary is designed to
reach, as illustrated by the case of a bank customer who hides in the bank until it
closes and then takes the bank's money. Moreover, this expansion forecloses any
argument by a defendant found in premises then closed that he had entered earlier
\yhen they were open. But for this expansion not also to cover certain other
situations in which the unlawful remaining ought not be treated as burglary, it is
best to limit the remaining-within alternative to where that conduct is done
surreptitiously.
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 8.13(b) at 468
(1986) (citations omitted).
The Florida Supreme Court had to deal with this e^cact situation in Delgado v.
Florida, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000). In that case, police found two bodies in a home. Id.
at 234. There were signs of a struggle. Id. The defendant's blood was found on the scene,
including the handgun determined to have filed the fatal khots. Id. His palm print was
found on the telephone and the last call made was to a fri|end of the defendant's. Id. He
was subsequently charged and convicted of murder and ^rmed burglary. Id. at 235.
Because there was no sign of forced entry, the state opin0d that Delgado had
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consensually entered the home and that the consent was subsequently withdrawn. Id. at
236. The court addressed the "remaining in" language in the statute.
The court, in addition to citing the Model Penal Code commentary, looked to New
York state, which also has the "remaining in" language. Id. at 237. The New York court
dealt with a case in which a person consensually entered a home and subsequently pulled
a knife on an occupant. Id. The state argued that the consent was automatically revoked
when the knife was pulled. The court disagreed:
[The State's] reasoning impermissibly broadens the scope of liability for burglary,
making a burglar of anyone who commits a crime on someone else's premises. It
erroneously merges two separate and independent elements that must coexist to
establish burglary: First, the trespassory element of entry or remaining without
license or privilege; second, intent to commit a crime. An intrusion without license
or privilege (unlawful entry) is the distinguishing element, the essence of burglary.
It must be established separately and distinctly from the intention to commit a
crime. The mere fact that a crime was committed or was intended is an insufficient
basis for finding that the entry or remaining was without privilege or authority.
Id. quoting People v. Hutchinson, All N.Y.S.2d 965,967 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), aff d 121
A.D.2d 849, 503 N.Y.S.2d 702 (App. Div. 1986), appeal denied, 498 N.E.2d 156 (N.Y.
1986).
Additionally, the New York courts addressed the "remaining in" language of the
statute, holding that "the Legislature was plainly addressing a different factual situationnot one of unlawful entry but of unauthorized remaining in a building after lawful entry
(as a shoplifter who remains on the store premises after closing)." Id. quoting People v.
Gaines, 546 N.E.2d 913,915 (N.Y. 1989).
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The court had grave concerns about construing the "remaining in" language to
imply that consent would be revoked once a person commits a crime on the property. Id.
at 238-39.
1 A] number of crimes that would normally not qualify as felonies would suddenly
be elevated to burglary. In other words, any crime, including misdemeanors,
committed on another person's premises would become a burglary if the owner of
the premises becomes aware that the suspect is committing the crime. Obviously,
this leads to an absurd result. For example, if a person hosts a party and catches an
invitee smoking marijuana on the premises, the invitee is not only guilty of a
misdemeanor marijuana charge but also of burglary, a second-degree felony. The
same can be said of the invitee who writes a bad check for pizza in front of an
aware host. The other extreme is also true. An invitee who commits second-degree
murder on another person's premises and in the presence of an aware host could be
charged with first-degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being
burglary. The possibility exists that many homicides could be elevated to firstdegree murder, merely because the killing was committed indoors.
Id. at 239. The court cited a dissenting opinion in Davis v. State, 131 So. 2d 480,484-86
(Ala. 1999) as persuasive for its decision in which Justice Almon expressed grave
concerns about "bootstrap!ing]" nearly every crime that Occurs indoors into a burglary
and potentially any murder which occurs indoors into a capital murder because of the
extra offense of burglary. Id. at n. 3.
The court held that the most consistent interpretation of Florida's burglary statute
was to hold
that the "remaining in" language applies only in situations where the remaining in
was done surreptitiously. This interpretation is consistent with the original
intention of the burglary statute. In the context of an occupied dwelling, burglary
was not intended to cover the situation where an invited guest turns criminal or
violent. Rather, burglary was intended to criminalize the conduct of a suspect who
terrorizes, shocks, or surprises the unknowing occupant. Many other states that
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have the "remaining in" language in their burglary statutes have included the word
surreptitiously or similar language in the statute.
Id. at 240 citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 401 (West 1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C18-2 (West 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-22-02(1) (1997); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
1201 (1998). See also S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-310 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 30.02 (West 1994); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-90 (Michie Supp. 1999).
The most rational justification under the common law for the "remaining in"
language occurs when a person lawfully enters a building and secretes himself, hiding
and waiting until after hours, then subsequently exits and commits a larceny or felony.
See, e.g., Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558,560 (Wyo. 1989) (defendant was at a bar and
pretended to go to the restroom and hid in a crawl space until after hours, when he tried
to break into the bar's safe). Several different applications of the "remains in" language
could clearly be used, all of which have the surreptitious element and fit a more
traditional definition of burglary:
1. An employee who remains after hours (if he does not have permission to be
there) intending to commit a theft.
2. A person who is authorized to be in the building for a particular purpose but
remains after to commit a felony or theft. For example, a repairman who stays
after the repairs to commit a theft or a maid who, after changing the sheets and
towels, remains to commit a theft.
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3. Another situation would be for a person who ha$ a lawful right to be in a place,
but manifests the intent to commit a crime once there. For example, a person
walks into a store intending to shop, but sees valuable property that they want
to steal. If the person merely walks out of the stdre with the property, he has
committed a theft and not a burglary because thp "remains unlawfully" element
has not been met. See State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2^I 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998). But
if the person secretes himself and waits for the employees to leave, then steals
the property, then he has committed a burglary. The clearer case would be if
the person was asked to leave by the store and subsequently secreted himself
and stole the property.
See Theodore E. Lauer, Wyoming Divison: Article: Burglary in Wyoming, 32 Land &
Water L. Rev. 721,753 (1997).
There is clear common-law precedent that burglary was intended for situations in
which a person unlawfully enters a property with the intejit to terrorize the occupants. In
the case of remaining unlawfully on the property, the common law supports the
suggestion that there needs to be an element of surreptitidusness for the offense to
become a burglary.
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B, Utah Law Supports the Requirement of a Surreptitious Element to the
"Remains Unlawfully" Element of Burglary
The first codified burglary statute occurred in 1851, soon after the Mormon
pioneers arrived in the Salt Lake Valley. According to that statute, "if any person or
persons shall unlawfully break into, or enter the yard or dwelling of any person, or into
their enclosure, or wagon, boat vessel or tent, with a criminal intent of any kind; they
shall be fined or imprisoned, or both at the discretion of the court." The State ofDeseret Appendix: Constitution and Ordinances (1849-1851) § 13, p. 215. In 1855, the
Legislature significantly broadened the definition of burglary to include something
similar to the modern "remains unlawfully" element. "If any person break and enter any
dwelling house in the night time, with intent to commit the crime of murder, rape,
robbery, larceny or any other felony; or after having entered with such intent, break any
such dwelling house in the night time, any person being then lawfully therein, such
offender shall be punished ..." Acts, Resolutions and Memorials, Passed at the Several
Annual Sessions of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, 1855, § 48, p. 18990 (1855). The legislature also allowed for burglary in the day, if the person, with intent
to commit a felony, breaks and enters (or at night breaks by itself) a house, office, shop,
store, warehouse, boat, vessel or any building where goods are kept for sale. Id, § 51, p.
190. The Utah Legislature in 1876 authorized a compilation of the various statutes then in
effect. Under that enactment, Utah defined burglary as "every person who, in the night
time, forcibly breaks and enters, or without force enters through any open door, window
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or other aperture, an house, room, apartment, tenement, or any tent, vessel, water craft, or
railroad car, with the intent to commit larceny or any other felony is guilty of burglary."
The Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah, Containing All the General Statutes Now In
Force, 1876, Title XII, Chapter II, § 256, p. 620 (1876). The statute also created a second
class of burglary, called housebreaking. "Every person who, in the day time, enters any
dwelling house, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, other building,
vessel, or railroad car, with intent to steal or to commit any felony whatever therein, is
guilty of housebreaking." Id. § 258, p. 620-21 (1876). See also, State v. Syddall, 433 P.2d
10,12-13 (Utah 1967) (Ellett, J. concurring) (Justice Elletjt gives a nice summary of the
history behind Utah's burglary statute).
In 1886, the Supreme Court had to determine whether sufficient evidence for a
burglary conviction existed. People of the Utah Territory v. Morton, 11 P. 512 (Utah
1886). In that case, the defendants were at a store at night, after the store had been closed.
Id. at 513. One defendant was arrested near the safe and ^ steel bit or drill was found on
the floor by him. Id. The court found it "irresistible" to conclude that the defendants had
any other purpose than to steal under the circumstances, 0ven though there was some
evidence the defendants may have had permission to enter. Id.
In 1902, the Supreme Court of Utah dismissed a c&se for insufficient evidence
when the state failed to show evidence that the burglary occurred at night. State v. Miller,
67 P. 790 (Utah 1902). In that case, the store owner testified that he locked the store at
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9:30 pm and found it burglarized the next morning at 6:30 am. Id. at 790. The court held
that it was essential to prove a burglary that the state show the acts occurred after
sundown or before sunrise. Id.
In 1905, the legislature amended the statutes to create first and second degree
burglary. State v. Hows, et al, 87 P. 163 (Utah 1906). When the legislature amended the
statute, it added the word "other" to burglary: "the intent to commit larceny or any other
felony." Id. at 163. The issue in Hows surrounded whether the state had to prove the
defendant's intent was to commit grand larceny. The court held that "any other felony"
could encompass crimes other than larceny, including petit and grand larceny. Id. at 16364. The court then discussed their perception of what constituted a burglary:
It is a matter of common knowledge that practically all offenses against the law of
burglary are committed with intent to steal, and, in nearly all cases, except when
the defendant is caught with the goods, the extent of the larceny which he intended
to commit cannot be proved.
Id. at 164.
In 1929, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a burglary conviction because it felt
the trial court failed to adequately present the defendant's theory of defense for a
burglary. State v. Evans, 279 P. 950 (Utah 1929). In that case, the defendant asserted that
he thought he had a right to enter the property and take some illegal liquor. Id. at 952.
The court held that the trial court had failed to properly instruct the jury that if the
defendant had a subjective belief that he had a right to the property, then he would not be
guilty of burglary. Id. at 952-53. See also State v. Crawford, 201 P. 1030 (Utah 1921)
42

(finding insufficient evidence to convict for burglary wheile the defendant was found in
possession of stolen items but no evidence was presented linking him to the break in).
The Utah Supreme Court has commented on Utah's common law tradition
regarding burglary, stating that "[a]t common law, the societal interests protected from
burglary were the sanctity and security of occupancy and tt^e dwelling place." State v. Pitts,
728 P.2d 113,115 (Utah 1986). The court in that case held that theft was necessarily
included in the modern definition of burglary because we no longer strictly relied on the
common law. Id. at 115-16.
The Supreme Court of Utah dealt with a burglary case in which the defendant
claimed the evidence did not support a conviction based qn intent. State v. Johnson, 111
P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989). In Johnson, the court found sufficient evidence because the "door
was not wide open, but only ajar, as if to conceal the fact ^hat someone was inside." Id. at
1073. The defendant was discovered, not by the door, but! by a bedroom. Id. The
defendant stated upon discovery that he did not intend to $teal anything. Id. A jewelry
box had been disturbed. Id. This evidence, the court said, gave a sufficient basis from
which the jury could infer intent. Id.
The defendant contends that Utah law stands for a few general propositions. First,
the law clearly requires some sort of "breaking." The early law also required a breaking
even if the person had lawfully entered—they had to "br0ak out." The early courts were
adamant that a breaking had to happen and that it had to happen at night, or in day, so
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long as this breaking occurred. The significance of this early idea is that burglary has
always revolved around a proposition that one gets into property they are not supposed to
be getting into, whether a locked safe or a home. As the Pitts court stated, the interest was
in the sanctity and security of one's property—a privacy and peace interest. See Pitts, 728
P.2d at 115. To this end, the state has to prove intent to commit a felony, assault or theft,
thought it almost always has to involve an intent to steal or to terrorize the occupants. See
State v. Hows, 87 P. 163, 164 (Utah 1906). The second principle is that some effort of
concealing has always been a part of burglary. The nighttime requirement clearly reflects
this intent. But even after the nighttime element was no longer part of the statute, the
courts have rejected convictions where there is an absence of concealing or if the person
had lawfully entered. See e.g., Evans, 279 P. at 952-53; Johnson, 111 P.2d at 1073.
Aggravated burglary, the Utah Supreme Court has said, "always requires proof
that the defendant entered or remained in a building." State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856
(Utah 1995). But what is required specifically to prove that a defendant "remained in" the
building unlawfully? The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue twice.
The first case was in 1985 and involved a defendant who went into a home with
three associates, one of whom pulled a gun on the inhabitants. State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d
874, 875-76 (Utah 1985). The defendant argued that the unlawful entry did not occur,
since they were invited onto the premises. Id. at 876. The court cited a Kansas court's
interpretation of similar language, stating, "remaining within refers to the situation where
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defendant's initial entry is authorized, but at some later time that person's presence
becomes unauthorized." Id. (emphasis added). The court fpund that the entry was likely
fraudulently obtained because the defendant, although he obtained consent to enter, did
not engage in the stated conduct once he was inside the h0me. Id.
In the second case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the "remains unlawfully"
provision applies when the initial entry was lawful. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874,
876 (Utah 1985). The Supreme Court was also asked to determine whether the "remains
unlawfully" provision applied only to situations in which the initial entry was lawful.
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). The Supreme Court declined to limit the
"remains unlawfully" language to lawful entries. Id. at 12^9. The Court also commented
on the requirements for committing the crime while remaining:
Rudolph further argues that applying the "remaining unlawfully" provision to all
situations, regardless of the lawfulness of the entry, will lead to a slippery slope,
making all crimes committed inside a building a burglary. The flaw in this
argument, however, is that even under our interpretation, the actor must commit or
form the intent to commit another crime at the tim$ he enters or while he remains
unlawfully in the building. In other words, if the actor commits a crime while
lawfully inside a building, there is no burglary. Thus, contrary to Rudolph's
argument, not all crimes committed in buildings will constitute burglary under our
construction of the "remaining unlawfully" provision of the burglary statute.
Id.
These cases are significant. According to the Supreme Court, a person cannot
commit burglary if he is legitimately on the property—evfen if he commits a crime there.
If he has a right to be on the property, he must do something more than commit a crime in
order to remain unlawfully. The court says that his presence must become unauthorized.
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Bradley, 752 P.2d at 876. The difficulty arises in determining what constitutes
"unauthorized" presence.
The Supreme Court clearly believed that something more needed to happen—and
they held that the person's presence needs to first become unauthorized and then he needs
to remain unlawfully on the premises. Third, he needs to form the intent to commit the
felony, theft or assault. The law clearly contemplates the classic situation: a person
secretes himself and goes into a place he has no right to be, taking property. He has now
done something affirmative to make his presence unauthorized and he remained
unlawfully on the premises.
A person's mere asking of another to leave cannot be construed to make the
subsequent criminal act a burglary. To do so would be to transform one crime into a
greater crime because of the conduct of the victim (not the conduct of the defendant) —
such a result in inconsistent with the law. Suppose Ms. VanDyke did not ask Mr. Rios to
leave her house and never pushed him out, but he assaulted her nonetheless. He would be
guilty of an assault and nothing more. Yet once she asks him to leave, and he commits an
offense, she has converted the crime into a burglary.
It might be helpful to consider Mr. Rios's case to see the potential inconsistencies.
If his crime were committed in a car—if Ms. VanDyke asked him to leave and he
assaulted her, he would be guilty of an assault but no more—even though she asked him
to leave. If they were in Ms. VanDyke's yard (clearly her private property) and he
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remained after she asked him to leave and he assaulted her, then he would be guilty of an
assault and likely a trespass, but not a burglary. Yet if sorriehow the event is transferred to
a building, then any sort of criminal offense that occurs in la building after having been
asked to leave could be bootstrapped to a burglary.
Mr. Rios's facts fit squarely within the definition of trespass—once Ms. VanDyke
asked him to leave, he had an obligation to comply—and when he didn't, he committed a
trespass, but not a burglary.
Burglary clearly contemplates more than just the commission of an offense in a
place where one has a lawful right to be. Otherwise, any drime committed in a building
would be a burglary. And, the "remains unlawfully" component of burglary clearly
requires something beyond committing an offense once a person has asked you to leave
because then crimes committed in people's yards or cars could also be burglaries so long
as the person asked the other to leave.
Defendant submits that in order to remain unlawfully, the burglary statute
implicitly implies that he do all of the three common elements of burglary. First, he
"breaks"—in the sense that he does something to violate the sanctity and security of
one's property. The classic example would be a traditional burglary in which one sneaks
through the window. In the case of remaining, he must st^y on the property once he no
longer has permission to be there. But this shouldn't end the inquiry. Once a person does
not have permission to be somewhere that he previously had permission to be, he must
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conceal himself or do something to hide his presence so that he may commit the crime.
This reading of burglary clearly differentiates it from trespass and other offenses and
would result in a more consistent application of the law. Again, this view is supported by
the drafters of the Model Penal Code, who themselves discouraged the use of the
"remains unlawfully" language, but if it were used believed that it needed to be read with
a surreptitious element. Model Penal Code § 221.1, cmt. 2 at 67. Third, once he
unlawfully remains and secretes himself, he must then form the intent to commit an
assault, felony or theft therein.
Defendant submits that under this reading of the burglary statute, he could not
have committed a burglary because the state presented no evidence that he concealed
himself or remained on the property surreptitiously when he was no longer authorized to
be there. As such, this court should reverse his conviction for aggravated burglary.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Rios asks this court to find that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of burglary because the state failed to present evidence that Mr.
Rios manifested an intent to commit a felony, theft or assault after he remained on the
premises. Additionally, the burglary statute requires an element of surreptitiousness
which was not present in this case and as such, his conviction should be reversed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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JEL P. NEWTON
attorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

A: The State of Deseret - Appendix: Constitution and Ordinances (1849-1851) § 13
B: Acts Resolutions and Memorials Passed by the First Annual and Special Sessions of
the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, 1855, § 48 (1855)
C: The Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah, Containing All the General Statutes
Now In Force, 1876, Title XII, Chapter II, § 256, p. 620 (1|876)
D: State v. Young, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 375 (Wash. dt. App. 2004)
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in the lawful defence, of their own life, or limb, or family, or their
liberty, or his or their property, or in the defence of any public
property, shall unavoidably take the life or lives of any person
or persons, on proof of the same before the court: he, she, or they,
shall be discharged from further prosecution.
Sec* 10. Be it further ordained, that when any person shall
be found guilty of murder, under any of the pifeceding sections
of this ordinance, and sentenced to die, he, she or they shall suffer
death, by being shot, hung or beheaded*
Sec* 11. Be it further ordained, that, when any person or
persons shall be found guilty of murder, and sentenced to diet as
the penalty of that offence, by any court in this State having
jurisdiction! the execution of the sentence shall be deferred, until
a transcript of the proceedings and decision of said court, shall
be furnished the executive of the State, and upon the acknowledgment of the receipt of the same to the clerk of the court having
framed the judgment, and the acknowledgment of the same shall
not be attended with a reprieve, commutation, or pardon; then, and
in that case, the culprit shall suffer death, as the court may have
directed.
Sec. 12. Be it further ordained, that if anv person or persons
shall, with criminal intent set fire to, or cause the same to be done,
to any budding of any description, or to any fence, rick of grain,
or hay, wagon, boat, vessel, raft, bridge or any description of
property whatever, they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, he, she, or they, shall be
fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court,- and, if
any person or persons shall set fire to any prairie or kanyon of
timber, they shall, on conviction thereof, be guilty of a high tms<*
demeanor, and shall be adfudged to pay all damages accruing
thereby, and be fined or imprisoned, or hoth, at the discretion of
the court.
Sec* 13* Be it further ordained, that if any person or persons
shall unlawfully break into, or enter the yard or dwelling of any
person, or into their enclosure, or wagon, boat, vessel, or tent,
with a criminal intent of anv kind; they shall befinedor imprisoned,
or both, at the discretion of the court.
Sec, M. Be it further ordained, that if any person shall swear
falsely, with evil design, pertaining to any case in issue before any
court, on conviction thereof, they shall be deemed guilty of perjury; and he or she shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, as the
court may direct; and if any person or persons shall hire, or cause
by any means whatsoever, any person to swear falsely in any case
in issue before any court; they shall, on conviction thereof, be
deemed guilty of pequry* and shall suffer the same penalty.
Sec. 15, Be it further ordained, that if any person or persons
shall commit a forgery, by making or altering any instrument of

ADDENDUM B
Acts Resolutions and Memorials Passed by the First Annual
and Special Sessions of the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory of Utah, 1855, § 48 (1855)
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fully and maliciously set fire to any other building, boat
or vessel owned by himself, or another, by which means
such inhabited building, boat or vessel is burnt; if such
offence is perpetrated in the night time, or so caused to
be burnt in the night time, such offender shall be P # M j t f ,
punished by imprisonment for life, or any term of
years; or if the crime shall have been committed in
the day time, such offender shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding thirty years.
SEC. 43. If any person wilfully and maliciously so
barn any uninhabited dwelling house, boat or vessel, 0tb*r *•"»'•••
belonging to another; or any court house, or other public building; if in the night time, be shall be punished eimlyby imprisonment not exceeding twenty-five year&; or if
in the day time, not more than twenty years,
SEC 44. If anv person wilfully and maliciously burn. _ . .
either m the night or day time, any warehouse, store, burning,
manufactory, mill, barn, stable, shop, office, out-house,
or any building whatsoever of another, other than is
mentioned in the preceding sections: or any bridge,
lock, dam, or flue, he shall be punished by imprison- peBaur.
ment not exceeding fifteen years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars.
SEC. 45. If any person set fire to any building, boat MU)uplto
or vessel, mentioned in the preceding sections, or to bum.
any material, with intent to cause any such building to
be burnt, he shall be punished by imprisonment not ex- p»«"»&mmt.
eeeding ten years, or fined not more than five hundred
dollars.
SEC. 46. If any person wilfully and maliciously
bum, or otherwise destroy or injure any pile or parcel B*ming no**
of wood, boards, timber, or other lumber; or any fence,, probity,
bars or gate; or any stack of grain; hay, or other vegetable product severed from the soil, and not started; or
any standing trees, grain, grass, or other standing product of the soil of another, he shall be punished by
imprisonment not more than five years, or by fine not *»«*,.
more than five hundred dollars; or both fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court
SEC. 47. The preceding sections under this title „
severally extend to a married woman, who comtoite S S S S either of the offences therein described, though the pro- misaperty burnt or set fire to may belong wholly or in part
to her husband.
Sic. 48. If any person break and enter any dwell- _ .
...
mg house m the night time, with intent to commit the wteat to **.
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crime of murder, rape, robbery, larceny* or any otln»r
felony; or after having entereld with such intend break
any such dwelling house in the night time, any person
being then lawfully therein, sluch oliender shall be punished according to the aggravation of the offence, as
provided m the following two sections.
SEC. 40. If such offender,! at the time of committing
suc
tmSSiuUaM ^ burglary, Ls armed with a dangerous weapon, or
«i<i»».
so arm htiast-If after having filtered such dwelling house,
or actually assault any person being lawfully therein;
or have any confederates present aidingan<l abetting in
Frailty,
such burglary, lie shall be punished by imprisonment
for life, or an? term of vearsL
SEC, 50. If such offender commit such burglary
if bandar? t*# otherwise than \% mentioned in the preceding section, he
^*™^smu» h\vd\\ fa punished by imprisonment not exceeding
twenty*five years.
SEC* 51* If any person with intent to commit a
felony in the day time, break) and enter, or in the Bight
^ J ^ time enter without breaking any dwelling house, or a;
any time break and enter any oftire, .shop, store, warehouse, boat or vessel, or any building in which goods
are kept for use, sale or deposit, he &hall be punished
,
by
imprisonment not m^re than ten years, or by fine not
p
more tlwm i:\e hundred dollar;*, or both flee and imprisonment,
i l l JL?jp V «

S E C . 52, If any person steal, take, and<earry away
i vt*nt d^ned of the property of a n u h e r , any money, good$, or chaftehs, any writ, process, or public record, any bond, bank
note, promissory note, bill of exchange, or other bill,
order or certificate, or any book of accounts respecting
money, goods, or other things or any deed, or writing
containing a conveyance of real estate, or any coutract
in hrct\ or any receipt, release, or defeasance, or any
instrument, or writing wherfeby any demand, right, or
obligation is created, increased, extinguished^ or dimipemfn**
niched, he is guilty of larceny, and shall be punished,
when the value of the property stolen exceeds the sum
of twenty dollars, by imprisonment not more than ten
years; and when the value of the property stolen does
not exceed the sum of twen£|y dollars, by fine not ex-
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The Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah, Containing All
the General Statutes Now In Force, 1876, Title XII, Chapter
II, § 256, p. 620 (187^)
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lag set on fire shall have been destroyed. It Is sufficient
{feat fire is applied so as to take enleet upon any part of the
mte&mm of the bnildfag.
(208&) SEC. 262. To eoastitate arson It is not necessary
that a person other than the -accused should hare had ownership m the building set on lire. It is suflicleJit, that at
the time of the burning another person was rightfully in
possession of, or was actually occupying such buDding, or
amy part ti*ereo£
(2088,) SEC. 253. Arson is dtfided Into two degrees.
(2084.) SBC. 251. MaKoiously burning in the night
time aa Inhabited building in which there Is at the time
some mamas being is arson in the first degree, all other
kinds of arson are of the second degree.
{2085.) SEC, 288. Arson is pnaishaMe by imprisonment
ia the penitentiary as fallows:
Rrst—Arson ia fte first degree, i » not less than two
years, nor more thanfifteenyears.
Seeoad—Arson la the second degree, for not less than
one nor more than ten years.

CHAPTER H
mrmi*km AJST» HOCSBBBEAKIX«.
SCCTIOKf.
3991 Burglary deflned.
2087. Poniabrntni ot batghuey.
3888. Hoa«br«*kiDgd#flM«!d.

Burglary
defined.

of baiRiwy.

Sxcrros.
» » . Panlshawsat ot homohreaklng.
am. "Sight time" AefoxtfL

($&8&) SJBC. 256. Every person who, ia i&e night time,
fomMy breaks m& eaters, &r wtt&oattae eaters through
any open door, window, or other aperture, any bouse,
room, apartment, or tenement, or any teat, vessel, water
eraft, or railroad car, with Intent to commit larceny, or any
felony Is gaflty of burglary.
(30874 SEC. 257, Burglary is punishable by imprisonment In the penitentiary not less than one nor more than
ten years,
(2088.) 8 m 258. Every person who, in the day time,
enters any dwelling bouse, shop, warehouse, store, mill,

COMPILED LAW* OF UTAH,

ill

barn, stable, outhouse, other building, vassal, or milrotd
oar, with intent to steal or to commit _
.ever
therein, is guilty of housebreaking,
(3089,) SEC. 259. Housebreaking m punishable by iin~ ^ J g » * t t t
prisonment in the penitentiary not less fhau six months nor &**«**»*
more than three years.
' (2000*) SEC, 260, The phrase " night time," m used ia -KSJW time*
this chapter! means the period between sunset and sunrise.

r»TTAT»TEK
HAVING

nm^mim

HI.

now mmimmusm AKI*

OF I.

DEADLY

W KAPOKS.
9001 Having |K»a#&i»i0zi of any Imtiru*
m«»t Willi Intent to eomm!lbiSJP»

20f$<> Hftviagt |NM«araloft€^4«»dly we»|>*
on wUhlnt«ntt<»<MQMatimitM^ull^

(2091.) SEO. 201* Every person having upon him a H»V!»* potpicklock, exowkey, bit, other instrument or tool* withiSMmwS07
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STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SCOT DANIEL YOUNG, Appellant
No. 51697-3-1
COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE
2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 375

March 15, 2004, Filed
NOTICE: [Ml RULES OF THE WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE WASHINGTON RULES OF COURT.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported at State v. Young, 120 Wn. App. 1047, 2004 Vtesh. App. LEXIS 1359
(2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 02-1-02187-0. Date filed:
12/18/2002. Judge signing: Hon. David F Hulbert.

DISPOSITION: Judgment and sentence reversed.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was convicted in the Superior Cburt of Snohomish County,
Washington, for second-degree burglary and sentenced accordingly. Defendant appealed.
OVERVIEW: Police responded to an alarm triggered at a business due tt>;a broken window. Defendant was
discovered inside a parked car near the broken window. At trial, defendant testified he did not remember
breaking a window at the business, did not remember entering the businbss,, and did not remember hearing the
alarm. The prosecution emphasized that defendant did not have any lawful, legitimate reason to break into or
remain in the building. On appeal, defendant contended that there was iinsufficient evidence to support the
jury's conclusion that he entered the building with the intent to commit a crime. The appellate court noted that
the State had to prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court
found that the State relied on the fact that defendant unlawfully entered ^nd remained, but failed to prove that
he entered with any intent to commit a crime. The appellate court concluded that the evidence did not justify a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite intent to commit a crime in the building.
OUTCOME: The judgment of the trial court was reversed.
CORE TERMS: intent to commit, reasonable doubt, inferred, legitimate ifeason, unlawfully, proven, prosecutor,
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remember, steal, degree burglary, guilt, prosecutor argued, defense counsel, alarm, commit a crime, trier of
fact, equivocal, burglary, commit, infer, evidence to support, broken window, permissive inference, requisite,
rebuttal, convict, window, parked, asleep, lawful
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Burdens of Proof > Prosecution
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Weight & Sufficiency
[HN1] The State must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the role
of the reviewing court to determine whether or not it believes the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence acknowledges the truth of the State's
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Property Crimes > Burglary & Criminal Trespass >
Burglary > Elements
[HN2] A person commits second-degree burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime against a person or
property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling, Wash. Rev.
Code § 9A.52.030. A jury is permitted to infer a fact essential to find guilt from another fact if reason and
experience support the inference.
Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Property Crimes > Burglary & Criminal Trespass >
General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure > Scienter > General Intent
[HN3] See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.040.
Criminal Law & Procedure > Scienter > General Intent
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > General Overview
[HN4] Intent to commit a crime may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of an act. Although intent may not be inferred from conduct patently equivocal, it may be inferred
from conduct that plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability. But for the fact finder to draw
inferences from proven circumstances, the inferences must be rationally related to the proven fact and the
presumed fact must follow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact.
COUNSEL: For Appellant(s): Thomas Michael Kummerow, WA Appellate Project, Seattle, WA.
For Respondent(s): Constance Mary Crawley, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA.
JUDGES: Authored by C. Kenneth Grosse. Concurring: Anne L Ellington, Susan R. Agid.
OPINION
PER CURIAM - Although a jury is permitted to infer a fact essential to a finding of guilt from other proven facts,
there is insufficient evidence here to support the inference or a conclusion that Young entered or remained in
the building with the intent to commit a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction is reversed.
FACTS

At approximately 2 a.m. on October 5, 2002, the alarm triggered at Barci Automotive in Everett. Everett police
responding to the call discovered a broken window. After Mr. Barci unlocked the door, a K-9 officer, his dog,
and other officers announced their presence and entered the building. [*2] The dog's actions indicated that
someone was inside an El Camino parked in the building near the broken window. An officer approached the
vehicle and saw Scot Young on the seat. Young did not respond to commands to show his hands. Young was
either ignoring the officers, asleep, or passed out from the consumption qf alcohol. He was arrested at the
scene and taken to police headquarters.
Young is a homeless person who worked in an Everett restaurant at times. In the hours between his shift and
his arrest he had a number of drinks. Young claimed he did not remember what happened after he left the
second bar until he was booked at the Snohomish County jail. Young wa^ charged with second degree
burglary. A jury trial followed.
At trial, Barci testified that he closed his business about 6 p.m. the evenihg before the break-in. He testified that
all the windows were intact at the time. He gave nobody permission to enter the business after closing. Police
testified regarding their arrival and what they found at the scene.
Young testified he did not remember breaking a window at the auto repai^ business, did not remember entering
the business, and did not remember hearing the alarm. He [*3] admitted pe was discovered in a parked car on
the premises, either asleep or passed out.
The jury was instructed regarding the permissive inference of intent in buiralary cases:
A person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime
against a person or property therein. This inference is not binding upon you and it is for you to determine what weight, if
any, such inference is to be given.

There was no objection to the instruction. 2

1 Instruction 9, Clerk's Papers at 39.
2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Dec. 2 and 3, 2002) at 65.

In closing argument, both the deputy prosecutor and defense counsel embhasized that the trial issue was
whether the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a crijne. The prosecutor discussed the
evidence and argued a permissible inference therefrom. The prosecutor Argued:
He [Young] had no reason to be in there. By the way, you don't have to pr^ve what kind of crime he
intended [*4] to commit. The theft, vehicle prowl, malicious mischief, any dumber of crimes. Only that he had
no legitimate reason to be in that building; and he had no legitimate reasob to be in there.3

3 VRP (Dec. 2 and 3, 2002) at 69.

Defense counsel argued there was no evidence indicating Young was in the building to commit a crime. He
argued that the building owner and the police suggested Young was there to steal, and that this was the
question the jurors had to answer,, whether Young entered the building to steal something. Counsel
acknowledged the permissive inference, but argued there simply was no evidence to support that Young had
any intent to commit a crime. He argued that it didn't make any sense for his client to break in to steal, and then
remain, sleep, or pass out after the alarm went off. Although Young did not recall any of the events, he and
counsel suggested Young entered the building to get out of the early morning cold and to sleep off his
drunkenness.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued the question [*5] before the jury was not whether Young broke in with the
intent to steal, but whether he had any lawful, legitimate reason to be in the building. The prosecutor argued
that Young did not have any lawful, legitimate reason to break into or remain in the building.
After rebuttal, the jury was excused to the jury room. After the jury left, defense counsel objected to the
prosecutor's argument, claiming that the prosecutor incorrectly stated the law by arguing that the State only had
to prove that Young did not have a legitimate reason for being in the building. Counsel argued the State's
burden was to prove that Young entered with the intent to commit a crime therein. The trial court asked defense
counsel what he would suggest the trial court do. Counsel suggested bringing the jury back into court for the
judge to reread the "to convict" instruction to them. Stating that he did so in an abundance of caution, the trial
court brought the jury back into court and reread Instruction 8, the "to convict" instruction, without further
comment.
The jury found Young guilty of second degree burglary. Young appeals.
DECISION
Young argues there is insufficient evidence to support the [*6] jury's conclusion that he entered the building with
the intent to commit a crime. We agree.
It is axiomatic that [HN1] the State must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. 4 It is not the role of the reviewing court to determine whether or not it believes the evidence at trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.6 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
acknowledges the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 6

4 State v. Green, 94 Wn. 2d 216, 220-21, 616 R2d 628 (1980); State v. Tongate, 93 Wn. 2d 751, 753, 613 P.2d 121 (1980).
5 Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)).
6 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).

[*7] [HN2] A person commits second degree burglary "if, with the intent to commit a crime against a person or
property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling." 7 A jury is
permitted to infer a fact essential to find guilt from another fact if reason and experience support the inference.
Specifically, RCW9A.52.040 provides:

<;
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[HN3] In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have
acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be
explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without sucp criminal intent

[HN4] Intent to commit a crime may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of an act 9 Although intent may not be inferred from conduct patently equivocal, it may be inferred
from conduct that plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability 10 But for the fact finder to draw
inferences from proven circumstances, the inferences must be rationally related to the proven fact and the
presumed fact must [*8] follow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact 11

7 RCW 9A 52 030 (emphasis added)
8 State v Bencivenga, 137 Wn 2d 703, 707, 974 P2d 832 (1999) (citing State v Jackson, 112 Wn 2d 867, 875, 774 P2d 1211
(1989) (quoting Tot v United States, 319 U S 463, 467, 63 S Ct 1241, 87 L Ed 15^9 (1943)))
9 State v Grimes, 92 Wn App 973, 982, 966 P2d 394 (1998)
10 State v Bergeron, 105 Wn 2d 1, 19-20, 711 P2d 1000 (1985) (citing State v Lewis 69 Wn 2d 120,124, 417 P2d 618 (1966))
11 Jackson, 112 Wn 2d at 875-76 (citing State v Jeffries, 105 Wn 2d 398, 442, 717 Ft 2d 722 (1986), and State v Blight, 89 Wn 2d
38,44, 569 P 2d 1129 (1977))

Under the circumstances here, Young's conduct is equivocal The State relies on the fact that Young unlawfully
entered and remained, but has failed [*9] to prove that he entered with any intent to commit a crime We hold
that the evidence does not justify a finding beyond a reasonable doubt thai Young had the requisite intent to
commit a crime in the auto body facility
Because we find the State did not prove that Young had the requisite intenf to commit a crime, the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct need not be addressed
The judgment and sentence are reversed
FOR THE COURT
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